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History and Eschatology: Jesus and the Promise of Natural Theology, by N. T.
Wright. Baylor University Press, 2019. Pp. xx + 343. $34.95 (hardcover).
DOUGLAS GROOTHUIS, Denver Seminary
N. T. Wright is a luminary of the biblical studies world, having authored
numerous large and well-received academic volumes on Christ, Paul, and
the early church. He has also written a remarkable number of books for
popular audiences, which evidences his pastoral concern as an Anglican
bishop. Eschatology and History: Jesus and the Promise of Natural Theology
places Wright in the world of academic philosophy vis-à-vis the Gifford
Lectures (in an otherwise well-documented academic work, the book sadly
lacks a general index). These lectures, which commenced in 1888, were
established by Adam Lord Gifford (1820–1887). Their purpose is to sponsor lectures to “promote and diffuse the study of Natural Theology in the
widest sense of the term—in other words, the knowledge of God.” Since
1888, the lectureship has sponsored eminent thinkers, such as William
James and Karl Barth, from diverse disciplines. Some lecturers have advocated natural theology, and some have not. Wright attempts to revise the
notion of what natural theology is and what it might accomplish.
But what does a distinguished biblical scholar such as Wright bring
to the Gifford Lectures? (He is not the first biblical scholar to give these
lectures, having been preceded by Rudolph Bultmann and James Barr.) To
answer that, we must first explain what is meant by natural theology—a not
uncontested matter. Barth famously considered natural theology treasonous against “God’s self-disclosure in Jesus as witnessed to by scripture,”
as Wright paraphrases him (x). For Barth, natural theology was a rival
source of authority and one easily co-opted by sinister movements like
National Socialism in Germany. Wright does not take Barth to be the end
of the story for natural theology, but rather a conversation partner—and
one he leaves behind fairly quickly.
After surveying several accounts of what natural theology is, Wright
gives his own rather vague understanding. “I take it for granted that
under all of these various ways of understanding ‘natural theology’ there
lies the great theological and philosophical challenge of talking about God
and the world and the relation between them” (x). As a biblical scholar,
Wright wants to see if “a biblical theology might offer some fresh parameters within which the old questions would appear in a different light” (xi).
Since I am a philosopher and not a biblical scholar, I will focus on
Wright’s account of the project of natural theology rather than going into
the details of his positive claim that the history of Jesus is part of God’s
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revelation to the world. Thus, I will concentrate on sections I and IV of the
book, which are more overtly about natural theology. The case that Wright
makes in sections II and III—“History, Eschatology, and Apocalyptic” and
“Jesus and Easter in the Jewish World”—is formidable and impressive,
but will not be my primary concern, since it seems more about biblical
studies than natural theology per se (although Wright wants to combine
them). Before giving Wright’s sense of the biblical scholar’s contribution
to natural theology, I need to discuss a bit of the history and logic of natural theology as I understand it.
Natural theology—whether practiced by Jews, Christians, or Muslims—
has been distinguished from revealed theology in that it appeals to aspects
of the natural order (the cosmos as a whole or in part) to find evidence
for the existence of a monotheistic God. As such, natural theology traditionally has not directly appealed to the events in history described in the
Bible as necessary for its rational cogency. Appealing to the Bible (special
revelation) is the domain of revealed theology, it has been claimed. If successful, the arguments of natural theology will provide rational support to
the claims that God exists as a creator (cosmological arguments), designer
(arguments from design), source of the moral law (moral arguments),
perfect being (ontological arguments), universal mind (conceptualist
arguments), source of veridical religious experience (religious experience
arguments), author of consciousness (arguments from consciousness),
ground of logic, and the guarantor that rationality fits the created universe
(rational inference and transcendental arguments).
It is a long and complicated story how each argument contributes to the
overall case for theism against its rivals. Some take an a priori approach
(the conceptualist and ontological arguments). Others are a posteriori
(cosmological, design, and religious experience arguments, etc.). There are
not only various kinds of natural theology, but each argument type is a
category for a family of related arguments. For example, there is the kalam
cosmological argument, the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) cosmological argument, the Thomistic cosmological argument, and so on. To my
mind, this is an embarrassment of riches. I find no reason to think that our
knowledge of God is limited to the deliverances of natural theology, since
God reveals himself in history (in mighty acts, through prophets, and the
Incarnation) as well. Nor have I found any conclusions drawn from natural theology to be contradictory to anything in the Bible (as Barth and others have feared). Natural theology claims that evidence for God is found
in aspects of nature that are universally and perpetually available through
observation, intuition, and inference. This common evidence is general
revelation, which provides the facts upon which arguments of natural
theology work. Natural theologians often appeal to biblical texts such as
Psalm 19:1–6 and Romans 1:18–21 to justify the claim that God reveals
something about himself in his creation. So, it is God himself who reveals
what can be known about God in nature without consulting the Bible as
positive evidence for God.
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Traditionally, arguments for Christianity based on particular historical events have not been considered the province of natural theology,
although they contribute to the larger case for Christianity. In the school
of classical apologetics (a prominent apologetic method), the metaphysical foundation for monotheism is established through natural theology
before investigating particular historical claims, such as Jesus’s deity, miracles, death, and resurrection. The latter are called “Christian evidences”
and are distinguished from the results of natural theology. Thus, if we
have good reason to believe in God, then we have reason to investigate
the claim that God may have incarnated in Jesus. Then, it is to history
that we go for more evidence for Christianity. For example, C. Stephan
Evans argues this way in his Natural Signs and Knowledge of God (Oxford
University Press, 2010). But, in most cases, the question of Jesus’s existence and nature has not historically been addressed directly by natural
theology. Why has this been so?
Natural theology has appealed to what all rationally functioning people can know about God through the orderly, repeated, perpetual, and
universal facts of nature, whether this be about the universe as a whole
(its beauty or order) or about some aspect of it such as one’s conscience
(its apprehension of an objective moral law). To cite another example,
the fine-tuning design argument appeals to features of the universe—its
laws, constants, and proportions—that are better explained by a designing intelligence than by chance or by natural law. History, on the other
hand, takes place on the theater of nature, but is made up of particular,
unique, and unrepeatable events that are not universally assessable, such
as the virgin birth and the death and resurrection of Jesus. Our knowledge of history comes from witnessing it ourselves or from oral or written
testimony. Thus, there are two sources of knowledge with two different
methodologies.
Enter Wright’s proposal: Natural theology should not be limited to its
traditional domain but should incorporate historical evidence as well.
He wants to “change the rules of the game” because the game has been
“artificially shrunk; rather as though a cricket match were to be played on
a baseball diamond, thus ruling out two-thirds of the cricketer’s field of
play and allowing both sides to contest any ‘results’” (xiii). He goes on:
“History, in other words, matters, and thus Jesus and the New Testament
ought by rights to be included as possible sources for the task of ‘natural
theology.’” (xiii). Jesus, after all, lived his life in the natural world, so why
shouldn’t the historical record of his life contribute to natural theology?
Wright’s burden is to open up the field of history for natural theology,
particularly the achievements of Jesus. His arguments for God’s revelation in the history described in the New Testament are strong and continue a case he has been making for at least three decades. However, the
inclusion of the historical evidence into the project of natural theology is
unconvincing to me for several reasons.
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First, Wright thinks that the agenda of traditional natural theology was
wounded beyond healing through the catastrophe of the Lisbon earthquake. Somehow the magnitude of this evil hamstrung natural theology
since it could not speak directly to the problem of evil. This account, however, appears to misconstrue the purposes and limits of natural theology.
Arguments for God from nature—whether cosmological or design—were
never meant to comprise the whole apologetic for Christian theism. Deists
may end there, but not Christians (or Jews or Muslims). These arguments
can, if successful, make theism more credible than other metaphysical
schemes, since the existence and configuration of nature (and human
nature) calls out for a creator, designer, and lawgiver. It is odd that Wright
downplays the significance of traditional natural theology without even
mentioning the more recent work of the likes of Richard Swinburne,
William Lane Craig, C. Stephen Evans, or J. P. Moreland, and other analytic philosophers of religion, who have all advanced natural theology
and brought it to a higher level than what it was at the time of the Lisbon
earthquake (1775). Moreover, that was a small disaster compared to the
2004 tsunami originating in Sumatra, Indonesia, which killed approximately 230,000 people. Yet natural theology goes from strength to strength
nonetheless, even as the earth shakes, the massive waves fall, and misery
is multiplied for humanity.
The possible defeater that evil poses to the rationality of theism can
then be met after the work of natural theology is done. This is accomplished
through the strategy of a defense or a theodicy. The historical particularities of Christian theism provide resources here through the Incarnation,
crucifixion, and resurrection of Jesus because they show that God is not
far off and unconcerned with our plight. God entered history in order to
redeem it (John 1:1–18; Philippians 2:5–11). Wright wants to make this
endeavor part of his “fresh” version of natural theology, but at the expense
of traditional natural theology.
Second, Wright repeatedly disparages traditional versions of natural
theology in unconvincing ways, thus making room for his “fresh” version.
But these criticisms are based on confusions. For example, he criticizes
the teleological argument (without ever giving it) for looking “back to a
‘Designer,’ but without recognizing the biblical insight that the ultimate
design looks forward to a still future world” (252). This is like criticizing the eggs for not providing the cheese needed for a good omelet. The
“ultimate design” is provided not by, say, the fine-tuning argument, but
by biblical revelation and the Christ event. This overall apologetic project
is a both/and (cosmology and history), not an either/or (cosmology or
history).
In his final chapter, “The Waiting Chalice,” Wright writes of his refashioned natural theology as opening up “reality in fresh ways.” This “reality in question turns out to be not the God of ‘perfect being,’ nor the
prime mover, nor yet the ultimate architect, but the self-giving God we
see revealed on the cross” (274). This commits the fallacy of the false
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dichotomy. The God described in the Bible, the One who writes the story
of history leading to the cross, is a Perfect Being (as the ontological argument claims). If not, as St. Anselm insisted, it would be wrong to worship him. God is the Prime Mover (cosmological argument) in the sense
of being the creator and sustainer of the cosmos, as Thomas claimed. God
is also the architect (design argument) who is the builder of all things, as
Hebrews 3:4 affirms. The arguments of classical and current natural theology are not terminal points in apologetics (as Wright fears), but entry
ways into the hall of theism. From there various evidential doors open—to
steal a metaphor from C. S. Lewis in Mere Christianity.
Third, Wright rejects an idea he claims is intrinsic to traditional views of
natural theology—the radical distinction between God and the universe.
Rather, God’s goal is to unite heaven and earth. He believes the heaven
and earth dichotomy comes more from Epicureanism than from the Bible.
Thus, for Wright, to argue from the natural to the supernatural—as does
natural theology—is somehow wrongheaded. If Wright means to reject
the Deist’s view of God as essentially unrelated to the world except as its
designer and creator, then he is correct, since God is both immanent and
transcendent (see Isaiah 57:15). However, none of the arguments from natural theology limit God to being transcendent, but not immanent, even if
they don’t speak directly to divine immanence. The ontological argument,
however, which Wright does not address, concludes that God exists as a
maximal being, which could include immanence or omnipresence.
Further, the claim that there is an eternal ontological difference between
deity and the cosmos is intrinsic to biblical religion. We must worship God,
not created things (idols). God is self-existent and eternal. The universe is
not. God is perfect and unlimited. The universe is not. Men and women
are made in God’s image and likeness, but they are not divine, since they
came into existence and are contingent. Even in the Incarnation, deity
and humanity do not mingle or fuse. Christ is rather a hypostatic union
of the divine and the human: one person in two natures. The Council of
Chalcedon (451) makes this abundantly and elaborately clear.
Wright offers a kind of anthropologically-focused natural theology
in chapter seven, “Broken Signposts,” in which he identifies seven common and troubled features of human life and how Christianity responds
to them by giving life and hope. This kind of natural theology, he says,
refers to the Second Person of the Trinity more than the First Person of the
Trinity, which has been the task of traditional natural theology. The broken
signposts are “Justice, Beauty, Freedom, Truth and Power, Spirituality and
Relationships” (234). Wright avers that these domains of human meaning “point” toward Christ’s cross, where God himself was “broken” for
humanity. Relating the work of Christ to human brokenness in seven
dimensions may be psychologically appealing and evangelistically fruitful to an unbeliever, since it puts their struggles into a theological context
which gives hope and meaning. However, I did not find in Wright’s treatment any specific argument form for this endeavor that would render it
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a kind of natural theology or apologetic strategy. Although Wright does
not mention it, his approach is similar to that of Peter Berger’s invocation
of several “signals of transcendence”—common aspects of everyday life,
such as absolute moral condemnation and play—that point beyond the
natural world to something transcendent (see A Rumor of Angels (Anchor,
1970)). However, Wright’s presentation is theologically richer and is specific about how Christ intersects the human condition.
My review has not done justice to much of what this book offers. Its
many merits as biblical research could and should be noted and debated.
But as a philosopher who is intensely interested in natural theology, I am
not convinced by Wright’s reconstruction of this ancient and august discipline. I am further concerned that he has downplayed or even denied
the significance of natural theology traditionally conceived and currently
practiced, which, if successful, builds a strong theistic foundation for the
kinds of biblical and historical arguments that Wright offers.

